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1. Introduction 
The ongoing approach of the European authorities to the difficulties in the Greek 
economy and the broader response to the financial crisis of 2007/2008 reveal 
significant policy shortcomings, which warrant some comment. This is especially 
the case from an Irish perspective as Ireland has, on a number of occasions, been 
held up as an ‘example’ in contrast to the Greek case, and as an example of the 
successful response by the European authorities in the post-2007/2008 financial 
crisis context (Sinn 2015). This characterisation however risks obfuscating one of 
the major structural weaknesses of the European policy response to date; namely 
the absence of an adequate counter-cyclical fiscal response at a European level, 
particularly from 2010 onwards. Moreover, European fiscal policy since that 
period has actually been decidedly pro-cyclical with the compounding effect of 
the austerity-type budgetary policies adopted impeding growth prospects and, in 
so doing, exacerbating the heightened levels of debt-to-GDP observed across 
many European countries, with Greece being the extreme case.  
 
In this note, we review European fiscal policy since the international financial 
crisis. We initially focus on the rationale for an expansionary European fiscal 
policy to the international financial crisis, particularly from 2010 onwards. We 
review some of the more significant contributions advocating a more 
expansionary policy and contrast the outcomes in both the European and US 
economies under the differing policy responses. Irish economic performance 
post-2007/2008 is then discussed in the context of the austerity debate.  In light 
of the fall-out from the financial crisis, we discuss the role an expansionary 
European fiscal policy could have played in supporting the Irish recovery over that 
period. In a concluding section, the policy issues concerning the future conduct of 
European fiscal policy are identified. 
 
                                                          
1  Thanks to Alan Barrett, David Duffy and an anonymous referee for comments on a previous draft. Any remaining 
errors are the responsibility of the author. 
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2. The European Level 
Budgetary policy across Europe since 2010 can be assessed from Figure 1, which 
plots the structural balances2 of a select set of European countries. 
 
FIGURE 1 Structural Balances of Select Euro Area Countries: 2010-2015 
 
 
Source: AMECO website. 
 
As the structural balance examines the fiscal policy stance independent of the 
economic environment, it is usually taken as being more reflective of 
discretionary changes in fiscal policy.  Across all countries it is evident that, since 
2010, the response of fiscal policy at a European level has been contractionary in 
nature.  
 
However, in stark contrast to this general tightening of discretionary European 
fiscal policy, the case for an expansionary fiscal response from 2010 onwards has 
been made by a wide number of commentators (see Mody, 2015 for a detailed 
treatment of the issue). One way to capture the degree of underperformance 
across the Euro Area and, hence, the rationale for an expansionary response is to 
review the output gaps3 for the same set of countries as in Figure 1 (Figure 2). A 
negative output gap indicates that the economy in question is performing below 
trend. 
 
                                                          
2  The balances are adjusted on the basis of the potential GDP excessive deficit procedure.  
3  The output gaps are the official Eurostat estimates from the AMECO website.  
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
%
 
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
 3 
FIGURE 2 Output Gap of Select Euro Area Countries: 2010-2015 
 
 
Source: AMECO website. 
 
While the particular underperformance of the countries referred to as the PIIGS 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) is clear, it is also evident that nearly all 
countries are performing below trend over this period.  
 
Blanchard and Leigh (2012 and 2013a) conduct a detailed assessment of the 
impact of austerity on European growth projections demonstrating the degree to 
which these forecasts have been steadily lowered since 2011.4 At that time most 
forecasts suggested that the economic slowdown would be subdued and that 
growth would rebound back. Blanchard and Leigh attribute much of the 
subsequent unexpected downturn in the Euro Area to the larger than anticipated 
consequences of fiscal austerity. In a cross-country graphical comparison of fiscal 
consolidation and the unexpected slowdown over the period 2011-2013, the 
negative relationship between these two variables would appear to confirm that 
the lesser growth rates occurred in instances where fiscal consolidation was 
larger. The harmful impacts on growth of the collective fiscal tightening across 
Europe are exacerbated by the significant levels of intra-EU trade. Thus, as 
domestic demand was adversely impacted by the fiscal stance of individual 
Member States, export demand was also negatively affected by the similar 
stances of other member countries.5  
 
In broader terms, as noted in Ireland’s case by Cronin and McQuinn (2014), an 
increasing number of empirical studies support the notion that fiscal multipliers 
are large during periods of economic downturn suggesting that fiscal stimuluses 
                                                          
4  Note Alesina et al. (2015) provide a somewhat alternative perspective on the role of fiscal policy.  
5  A point also made by Blyth (2015).  
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
%
 
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
4 
can play an important role; however the collorary is also true; tightening 
budgetary policy has a more negative effect when economies are below trend. 
Examples of such studies include Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Batini et 
al. (2012), Baum et al. (2012) and Riera-Crichton et al. (2014) and, in a celebrated 
contribution, DeLong and Summers (2012) who argue that with a zero lower 
bound lower interest rate, expansionary fiscal policy is self-financing in a 
depressed economy.  In the presence of a liquidity trap, DeLong and Summers 
(2012) note that the impact of fiscal policy on economic activity and employment 
is enhanced as the presence of low interest rates minimises the crowding-out 
effects that often mitigate the effects of fiscal policies. 
 
Of course one consequence of lower than expected growth rates over this period 
is that, in stark contrast to its intended consequence, the debt-to-GDP ratios (a 
crucial indicator of fiscal sustainability) actually disimproved because of the 
respective budgetary policy. Blanchard and Leigh (2013b) note that the debt 
ratios for European countries have been higher than projected. In the case of 
Greece both Krugman (2015b) and Wren Lewis (2015) have documented how 
achieving a primary surplus involves adopting an intensely contractionary fiscal 
policy such that the economy shrinks by a good degree more than the 
improvement in the primary surplus. Therefore, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
disimproves quite significantly in the short to medium term. The effect of a 
tightening fiscal policy is further accentuated by the depressing impact on the 
GDP deflator, resulting in a greater deterioration in the debt-to-GDP dynamics. As 
Mody (2015) concludes, the ‘evidence is clear and the assessment is rather 
pessimistic. After the enormously costly austerity, the debt ratios have gone up in 
most Euro Area countries’. 
 
The fiscal response of the European authorities can be compared with the 
expansionary policy of the United States over the same period.  In 2009, the US 
Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) into law, 
the primary objective of which was to support employment measures in light of 
the post-2007 economic downturn. The approximate cost of the economic 
stimulus package is estimated to be $831 billion between 2009 and 2019. While 
some commentators, such as Krugman (2009), argued that the stimulus fell short 
of what was needed to re-stimulate US growth, it is interesting to compare the 
unemployment rate in the Euro Area and the US since 2007 (Figure 3). Initially, 
both areas experienced a significant increase in unemployment as the financial 
crisis unfolded, with the respective elevated jobless rates almost identical 
through 2009 and 2010. However, thereafter, the rates start to diverge with the 
US unemployment rate lowering to 5.4 per cent in Q2 2015 contrasting with an 
equivalent Euro Area rate of 11.1 per cent.  
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Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), in assessing the effectiveness of the US response, 
contend that the stimulus mostly compensated for the negative stimulus – at 
state and local level – associated with the collapsing tax revenue and the limited 
borrowing capacity of the individual states. While this is a significant 
accomplishment, as Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) argue, the net effect is that 
the consolidated fiscal expenditure stimulus is small relative to the sharp fall in 
private aggregate demand. 
 
FIGURE 3 US and Euro Area Unemployment Rates 2007-2015 
 
 
Source: AMECO and Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) websites.  
 
Over the longer term, the ramifications of the significant European policy mis-
calculation are compounded by pessimistic growth prospects for the Euro Area. 
McQuinn and Whelan (2015), in updating analysis from before the financial crisis, 
find that the long-term growth prospects of the Euro Area have deteriorated 
further. With TFP growth continuing to fall, Europe’s demographics are now also 
contributing to a decline in the workforce and hence to economic growth. Against 
this backdrop, McQuinn and Whelan argue that, even with the successful 
adoption of certain significant structural reforms, the European economy is still 
only likely to grow between 1 and 1.5 per cent per annum over the period 2015-
2033. Clearly, such a slowdown in growth rates over the longer term raises 
significant difficulties for the future sustainability of the increased debt levels 
observed. 
 
3. The Irish Recovery 
Given the recent performance of the Irish economy, it is timely to assess how the 
domestic recovery could have benefitted from a countervailing fiscal policy at the 
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European level. From a budgetary perspective, the Irish authorities had little 
option but to pursue a contractionary (and intensely pro-cyclical) budgetary 
policy from 2008 onwards; the Exchequer balance, which had recorded a surplus 
of 1.2 per cent in 2006, quickly deteriorated to -7 per cent in 2008 and peaked in 
a negative context at just under -15 per cent in 2011. With the country priced out 
of sovereign bond markets and forced into a programme of support, there was 
little option, given the European policy framework, other than to correct the 
fiscal accounts. As can be seen in Figure 1, for the countries considered, the 
contractionary fiscal policy undertaken by the Irish authorities was, over the 
period 2010-2015, second only to Greece in improving its structural balance.  
 
To understand the nature of the Irish recovery, some insight can be provided by 
taking the following simplified version of a standard Keynesian model: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 = 𝛽1𝑋 − 𝛽1𝑆  (1) 
𝑋 = −𝛽2𝑃  (2) 
∆𝑃 =  𝛽3𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦  (3) 
∆𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 =  −𝛽1𝛽2𝛽3𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦  (4) 
 
In this highly parsimonious model, the Irish output gap (ygap) is assumed to be a 
function of just net exports (X) and the structural balance (S). Exports are then a 
function of the real exchange rate, which in this case we take as the nominal price 
level (P) as foreign prices are assumed to remain constant. The change in prices 
(∆P), a form of simplified Philips curve, is a function of the output gap. Taken 
together this leads to the final expression (4); output self corrects overtime, so if 
the domestic economy experiences a deflationary period, relative prices decline, 
competitiveness improves and exports start to increase.  
 
In this model, once the initial deflationary policy ceases i.e. as the Government 
modifies its fiscal retrenchment to reduce the structural balance, the economy 
starts to converge back to its long-run level. The convergence process is a 
function of the output gap and three parameters; the multiplier, the sensitivity of 
the trade balance to the real exchange rate and the sensitivity of inflation to the 
output gap. Using plausible assumptions for these parameters, Krugman (2015a) 
characterises the recent performance of the Irish economy. That is, the fiscal 
response allied to the initial shock experienced by the economy precipitated a 
significant decline in output; once competitiveness was improved and the 
severity of budgetary policy abated, the economy started to increase back 
towards its steady-state level. Byrne and McQuinn (2014) offer a similar analysis 
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of recent Irish performance as a case of an economy converging back to its 
steady-state level. 
 
However, this self-correction comes at some cost in terms of the resulting 
volatility in economic activity. To that end it’s worth examining the scale of 
changes in the levels of key Irish economic variables. In Figure 4, we plot actual 
(2000-2014) and forecast (2015) income per capita and income per worker in the 
Irish economy. 
 
FIGURE 4 Actual (2000–2014) and Forecast (2015) Irish Economic Performance  (Index 2007 = 100)
 
 
Source: ESRI.  
 
While the recent growth rates of the Irish economy are impressive, particularly 
when compared with other European countries, the chart places the levels of the 
key economic outcomes in perspective. Even with the strong growth rates, it is 
evident that the Irish economy will not be back to its pre-crisis income levels until 
2016 or 2017 at the earliest. This illustrates the lost capacity of the economy and, 
hence, the potential for policy at the European level to have ameliorated the 
decline in output and general activity experienced in the Irish case.  
 
Significant fluctuations in economic activity, such as those experienced in the Irish 
case, lead to disruption in many areas of the economy; Blanchard and Leigh 
(2013b), for example, highlight the persistent fall in investment which can 
accompany a pronounced fiscal co-ordination. In the Irish economy, after 2007, 
housing construction, for example, went from an annual average of over 80,000 
80.0
85.0
90.0
95.0
100.0
105.0
110.0
115.0
120.0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Income Per Capita Income Per Worker
8 
units per annum for the period 2005-2007 to just over 10,000 units per annum 
between 2012 and 2014. The collapse of housing investment has occurred 
despite evidence of significant underlying structural demand for housing in the 
Irish economy (see Byrne et al., 2014). 
 
As well as standard macroeconomic reasons for an EU-wide stimulus, the 
particular implications of the post-2007 downturn for the Irish financial sector 
provides ample reasons why such a policy would have yielded a number of 
benefits in the domestic case. 
 
After 2010, the Irish economy was subject not just to an intensely contractionary 
fiscal policy but also to a contractionary prudential or banking one. The 
dislocation caused by the financial crisis resulted in the main Irish financial 
institutions having to deleverage or reduce their balance sheets in a considerable 
manner. Indeed, the programme of support negotiated between the Irish State 
and the Troika (EU Commission, ECB and the IMF) in October 2010 specified a 
reduction in the loan-to-deposit ratio of these institutions from 177 per cent to 
122.5 per cent over a three-year horizon. This highly aggressive target constituted 
a dramatic reduction in the size of the Irish financial sector as can be evidenced 
from Figure 5 which plots total lending and deposits to Irish resident private 
sector enterprises. Although much of this deleveraging was aimed at reducing the 
non-core elements of banks lending, overall, given the scale of the reduction, it 
almost certainly exerted a negative impact on Irish economic activity.  
 
FIGURE 5 Loans and Deposits to the Irish Private Sector 2003-2015 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of Ireland. 
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While the scale of deleveraging was not quite so severe across Europe, many 
economies were confronted by this set of simultaneously contractionary fiscal 
and prudential pressures. 
 
Support from a countervailing EU-level stimulus would have been particularly 
beneficial for the Irish economy in dealing with the high degree of private sector 
indebtedness experienced from 2007/2008 onwards. McCarthy and McQuinn 
(2015) highlight the degree of household level debt in Ireland vis-à-vis other 
OECD countries and provide micro-based empirical evidence for the negative 
impact of household deleveraging on consumption in the Irish market. Mody 
(2015), for example, criticises the single-minded focus on austerity in the 
presence of high private debt burdens arguing that Irish and Spanish households 
who tried to address their debt obligations in the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis actually saw an increase in their debt-to-income ratios initially as their 
disposable incomes fell. Figure 6 plots total Irish household liabilities along with 
the ratio of debt to disposable income; from the graph the substantial increase in 
total household debt in the lead up to 2007 is evident. However, it is also clear 
that while total household debt peaked in 2008, the ratio of debt to income 
continued to increase until late 2012 as income levels fell.  
 
FIGURE 6 Irish Household Debt 2002-2012 
 
 
Source: Central Bank of Ireland. 
 
4. Policy Conclusions 
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A number of significant policy contributors have advanced the case for a 
substantial fiscal stimulus at the European level; Sapir and Wolf (2014), in an 
open letter to the then incoming EU Commission, argue for a new investment 
programme amounting to at least 1 per cent of EU GDP in addition to 
investments currently planned. Sapir and Wolf (2014) suggest that part of this 
investment should be designed and implemented through national fiscal policies 
by increasing public investment. Countries which have the fiscal space should be 
encouraged to stop outperforming against fiscal targets, while other countries 
with limited space should commence a new deficit-financed investment 
programme. However, the greater component of any such investment response 
should be financed at the European level, mainly through the European 
Investment Bank, project bonds and an increase and improvement in the EU 
budget. Finally, those countries with weaker economic circumstances should 
disproportionately benefit from such a policy. 
 
McQuinn and Whelan (2015) note that while the Euro Area’s current ratio of 
public debt to GDP is high by modern historical standards, many of its Member 
States are able to borrow at very low rates and the pricing of ESM-issued 
securities shows that there are few concerns about the solvency of the Euro Area 
as a whole. Thus, they argue that a strong economic case exists for a large 
investment programme aimed at reducing unemployment and raising the supply 
capacity of the economy, funded by the Euro Area as a whole. 
 
At present, Europe’s political constraints clearly rule out such a programme for 
the foreseeable future with the current ‘Juncker plan’ with its very limited use of 
European public funds appearing to represent the limit of what is politically 
achievable at present.  
 
This inevitably gives rise to the argument for greater fiscal integration in 
correcting some of the architectural weaknesses in the present European policy 
set-up. Allard et al. (2013), in addressing the concept of a fiscal union for the Euro 
Area, argue that more fiscal integration can ultimately provide a greater capacity 
for country-level shocks, whether exogenous or domestically-determined, to 
spread across the Euro Area. They note that the origin of much of the present 
difficulties in Europe are due to the merger of domestic fiscal and banking 
vulnerabilities, combined with extensive financial linkages across countries which 
culminated in country-specific shocks propagating into systemic ones.6 This 
mainly occurred due to the absence of any mechanisms to deal with such shocks. 
                                                          
6  Gai et al. (2011) illustrate how greater complexity and concentration in the financial network may actually amplify 
this fragility.  
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Thus, greater fiscal integration can provide an ex ante framework for enforcing 
fiscal discipline and temporary transfers. An integral component of such a 
framework would entail some form of common borrowing (backed by common 
revenue) to finance better risk sharing and stronger backstops. This ex ante 
sharing of risk ensures that at a particular point in time those countries 
experiencing better cyclical conditions support those that are not. Furthermore, 
Allard et al. (2013) demonstrate that, with such a risk-sharing mechanism in place 
over a sufficiently long period, all current Euro Area member countries would 
have benefited from transfers at some point. 
 
Therefore, it is incumbent on domestic policymakers to: 
(a) Address the institutional issues which prevent the formation of an effective 
fiscal union within the Euro Area. This may well give rise to certain difficulties 
from an Irish perspective with greater focus on issues such as the 
harmonisation of corporate tax rates. Ultimately, this will involve some 
estimation and assessment as to the relative trade offs of the different policy 
options.  
(b) Equally, if not more important, highlight the economic rationale or lack 
thereof which has underpinned the fiscal response of European authorities to 
date. As a number of commentators have pointed out, the relentless pursuit 
of austerity at a time of contracting economic activity and in the presence of 
sizeable public debt is not part of traditional mainstream economic policy 
thinking (see Parenteau (2015) for example) and is at variance with the more 
successful policy response in other jurisdictions. This point must be clearly 
understood in terms of both domestic and European wide debate on the 
future direction of Euro Area-wide macroeconomic policy. 
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